Abstract. In this note we study the effect of adding fixed points to justification logics. We introduce two extensions of justification logics: extensions by fixed point (or diagonal) operators, and extensions by least fixed points. The former is a justification version of Smoryǹski's Diagonalization Operator Logic, and the latter is a justification version of Kozen's modal µ-calculus. We also introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs, and formalize the Knower Paradox and the Surprise Test Paradox in these extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for which there is no justification, we give a solution to the self-reference version of the Surprise Test Paradox in quantified logic of proofs.
Introduction
Justification logics provide a framework for reasoning about epistemic justifications. Justification logics evolved from a logic called Logic of Proofs LP, introduced by Sergei Artemov in [3, 4] , which try to give an arithmetic semantics for modal logic S4 and intuitionistic logic, and formalize the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogrov semantics of intuitionistic logic. Justification logics are extensions of classical logics by justification assertions t : F , which is read as "t is a justification for F ". Some of the justification logics enjoy the arithmetical completeness theorem, with the provability semantics of t : F as "t is a proof of F in Peano arithmetic PA".
Justification logics could be also considered as logics of knowledge, and are contributed to the study of Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. In this respect LP can be also viewed as a refinement of the epistemic logic S4, in which knowability operator A (A is known) is replaced by explicit knowledge operators t : A ("F is known for reason t"). The exact correspondence between LP and S4 is given by the Realization Theorem: all occurrences of in a theorem of S4 can be replaced by suitable terms to produce a theorem of LP, and vice versa. Regarding this theorem, LP is called the justification counterpart of S4. The justification counterpart of other modal logics were also developed (see e.g. [13, 25, 27] ).
Since some of the justification logics enjoy the arithmetical completeness theorem, it is natural to ask if the ability of constructing self-reference statements in PA, by means of the Gödel's Fixed Point (or Diagonal) Lemma, can be simulated in justification logics. In the context of language, a statement is self-reference if it refers to itself or its referent. The Fixed Point Lemma in PA enables us to construct sentences which behaves like the self-reference sentences. Such a self-reference statements have been used to show important results in PA and arise significant philosophical issues, e.g. Gödel's incompleteness theorems (by constructing a sentence which state its own unprovability), Tarski's undefinability of truth (by constructing a sentence which state its own falsity, the Liar Paradox), Kaplan-Montague's Knower Paradox (by constructing a sentence which state its own unknowability).
In the framework of modal logics, the Gödel-Löb provability logic GL is one of the well-known modal logics which is arithmetically complete. Obviously the justification version of the Regularity rule does not hold in justification logics A ↔ B t : A ↔ t : B JReg
In other words, two equivalent statements have not necessarily the same justifications (see [23] for a version of SE in the logic of proofs). Thus, instead of proving a fixed point theorem in the framework of justification logics, we extend the language and axioms of justification logics by fixed point formulas and fixed point axioms respectively. We consider two extensions of justification logics: extensions by fixed point (or diagonal) operators, and extensions by least (and greatest) fixed points. The former is a justification version of Smoryǹski's Diagonalization Operator Logic [47] , and the latter is a justification version of Kozen's modal µ-calculus [32] . In this paper, we do not introduce any semantics for these extensions. However, the consistency of some of these extensions are shown by translating them into their counterpart modal logics. We also introduce fixed point extensions of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs [22] , and formalize the Knower Paradox and the Surprise Test Paradox in these extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for which there is no justification, we give a solution to the one-day case self-reference version of the Surprise Test Paradox in quantified logic of proofs. To this end, we give a simple semantics (single-world Kripke model) for a fragment of quantified logic of proofs. We also show that the one-day case non-self-reference version of the paradox is an epistemic blindspot for students (cf. [49] ).
Fixed points in arithmetic
In this section we recall some well known consequences of the Fixed Point Lemma (or Diagonal Lemma) in extensions of Peano Arithmetic PA.
1 In this paper we do not distinguish between the number n and its numeraln. The Gödel number of formula A is denoted by A . The following (generalized) Fixed Point Lemma is taken from [11] .
Lemma 2.1 (Fixed Point Lemma). Let T be a theory extending PA. For every formula ϕ(x, y 1 , . . . , y n ) there exists a formula D(y 1 , . . . , y n ) such that
This lemma enables us to formalize self-references sentences in PA. Gödel uses this lemma 2 to construct a sentence in PA which states "I am not provable in PA."
Theorem 2.1 (Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem). Let T be a recursively axiomatized complete theory extending PA. Then T is inconsistent.
Theorem 2.2 (Tarski's Undefinability of Truth). Let T be a theory extending PA, and T r(x) be a truth predicate, i.e a predicate with one free variable x such that for every sentence A
Tr. T ⊢ A ↔ T r( A ).
Then T is inconsistent.
In fact, the sentence D in D ↔ ¬T r( D ) correspond to the Liar Sentence:
"This statement is false" and the argument given in the proof of Tarski's theorem, which expresses that the Liar Sentence is true if and only if it is not, is known as the the Liar Paradox. The scheme Tr is called the Tarski biconditional or T-scheme.
In the following we consider the Surprise Test Paradox. This paradox first published by O'Connor [41] with the name "Class A blackout." In the following we give the more common formulation of the paradox, the Surprise Test (or Examination) Paradox, which is given by Weiss [53] (under the name the Prediction Paradox). For a survey of the paradox see [15, 50] .
The two-day case of this paradox is as follows:
"A teacher announces that there will be exactly one surprise test on Wednesday or Friday next week. A student objects that this is impossible. If the test is given on Friday, then on Thursday I would be able to predict that the test is on Friday. It would not be a surprise. The test could not be given on Wednesday too. Because on Tuesday I would know that the test will not be on Friday (as shown in the previous reasoning) and therefore I could foresee that the test will be on Wednesday. Again a test on Wednesday would not be a surprise. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a surprise test."
The one-day case of the paradox is as follows:
"You will have a test tomorrow that will take you by surprise, i.e. you can't know it beforehand"
As it is clear from the above formulations of the paradox, "Surprise test" is defined in terms of what can be known. Specifically, a test is a surprise for a student if and only if the student cannot know beforehand which day the test will occur. Some authors interpret the surprise (or the knowledge) in this paradox in terms of deducibility. Specifically, a test is a surprise for a student if and only if the student cannot deduce logically beforehand the date of the test. This interpretation was first proposed by Shaw [46] . Regarding this interpretation, Fitch [19] show the relation between a version of the Surprise Test Paradox and Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. Kritchman and Raz [31] also show the relationship between the paradox and Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
The self-reference version of the paradox (adopted from [18, 30] ) is as follows:
"Unless you know this statement to be false, you will have a test tomorrow, but you can't know from this statement that you will have a test tomorrow."
The above version of the paradox is called the Examiner Paradox in [18] .Ègrè defined a knowledge predicate as a predicate satisfying the principle of knowledge veracity: K( A ) → A, for every sentence A. Now, using a knowledge predicate, the Examiner Paradox is formalized as follows:
where E denotes the sentence "you will have a test tomorrow." Using (1),Ègrè proved the following.
Theorem 2.3 ([18]
). Let T be a theory extending PA, with I(x, y) a formula expressing derivability between formulas of T , and K(x) a unary predicate such that for every sentence A
Assumptions U, I, and R could be replaced with a stronger assumption, a rule similar to the modal necessitation rule, as follows.
Theorem 2.4. Let T be a theory extending PA, and K(x) a unary predicate such that for every sentence A [30] , and basically is the epistemological counterpart of the Liar Paradox.
Theorem 2.5 (The Knower Paradox, [30] ). Let T be a theory extending PA, with I(x, y) a formula expressing derivability between formulas of T , and K(x) a unary predicate such that for every sentence A and B
T. K(
Similar to the Tarski's Undefinability of Truth (Theorem 2.2), the Knower Paradox can be seen as the Arithmetic Undefinability of Knowledge. The following variant of the Knower Paradox is given in [38] by Montague.
Theorem 2.6 ([38]
). Let T be a theory extending PA, and K(x) a unary predicate such that for every sentence A
Then T is inconsistent. Theorem 2.7. Let T be a theory extending PA, and B(x) a unary predicate such that for every sentence F and G
Fixed points in modal logics
In this section, we recall two kind of extensions of modal logics with fixed points: fixed point (or diagonal) extensions of modal logics where first introduced by Smoryǹski in [47] , and modal µ-calculus (modal fixed point logics) where first introduced by Kozen in [32] . We first recall definitions of normal modal logics. Modal formulas are constructed by the following grammar:
where p is a propositional variable, ⊥ is a propositional constant for falsity. The basic modal logic K has the following axiom schemes and rules:
Taut. All propositional tautologies,
The rules of inference are Modus Ponens and Necessitation rule:
Other modal logics are obtained by adding the following axiom schemes to K in various combinations:
In this paper we consider the following 15 normal modal logics: K, T, D, K4, KB, K5, KB5, K45, D5, DB, D4, D45, TB, S4, S5. The name of each modal logic indicates the list of its axioms, except S4 and S5 which can be named KT4 and KT45, respectively. The axiom D is equivalent (over K) to ⊥ → ⊥.
The Gödel-Löb provability logic GL has a central role here. GL is obtained from K4 (or K) by adding the Löb axiom scheme:
Modal logics with fixed point operators
Suppose ML is a propositional modal logic defined over a language L. We write A(p, q 1 , . . . , q n ) to denote that p, q 1 , . . . , q n are all the propositional variables occurring in the formula A. An occurrence of a propositional variable p in the formula A(p, q 1 , . . . , q n ) is called modalized if p occurs in the scope of a modal operator or ♦. Let L(FP) be the extension of L by n-ary fixed point operators (or diagonal operators) δ A (q 1 , . . . , q n ) for each L-formula A(p, q 1 , . . . , q n ) in which p is modalized. The fixed point extension (or diagonal extension) ML(FP) of modal logic ML in the language L(FP) is an extension of ML by axiom schemes
where
Using fixed point extensions of modal logics we can give the analogs of the Knower and the Believer Paradoxes.
Theorem 3.1 (The Knower Paradox in the framework of modal logics). Let ML be a propositional modal logic which contain the axiom scheme
Proof. The proof is obtained from the proof of Theorem 2.6 by replacing the knowledge predicate K by .
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3.2 (The Believer Paradox in the framework of modal logics). Let ML be a propositional normal modal logic which contain the axiom schemes
Thus, for example, the systems T(FP), S4(FP), and D4(FP) are inconsistent. On the other hand, by the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem, K4(FP) is a conservative extensions of GL, and hence K4(FP) is consistent. [11, 47] ). For any GL-formula A(p,q) in which p is modalized, there exists a unique formula
Smoryǹski in [47] showed that K4(FP) is a conservative extensions of GL.
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Theorem 3.4 ([47]
). Given any GL-formula A, the following are equivalent:
In fact GL is a modal logic with built-in fixed point property (the Fixed Point Lemma of arithmetic is modally expressible in GL by the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem). In GL the following is provable
Thus A is the fixed point of B(p) = (p → A). As it is pointed out in [45] , the De Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem shows that "how the single instance LF [here the fixed point equation (2)] is sufficient to yield the strongest version of diagonalization expressible in the language of modal logic." There are other modal logics with the fixed point property:
-Gödel-Löb-Solovay provability logic GLS introduced by Solovay in [48] . Axioms of GLS are all theorems of GL and the axiom scheme A → A, and its only rule of inference is Modus Ponens.Ègrè in [18] claims that GLS gives a soulution to the Knower Paradox via a hierarchy of rules (Modus Ponens could be applied to all theorems, while Necessitation rule could be applied only to theorems of GL). -Sacchetti in [44] introduced two families of modal logics with the fixed point property: K + ( n A → A) → A, for n ≥ 1, and K + n ⊥, for n ≥ 1, where n denotes n consecutively occurrences of .
Modal µ-calculus
Modal µ-calculus [12, 29, 32 ] is a logic used extensively in certain areas of computer science. It was first introduced by Kozen in [32] . The language of the modal µ-calculus is an extension of the language of modal logic with variable binding operator µp (the least fixed point operator). The expression µp.A is intended to present, by the Knaster-Tarski theorem, the least fixed point of the operator naturally associated with the formula A(p). Theorem 3.5 (Knaster-Tarski). Given a set S, any monotone operator Φ Φ : P(S) → P(S) within the ordering (P(S), ⊆) has a least fixed point and a greatest fixed point.
Formulas of modal mu-calculus are constructed by the following grammar:
provided that every free occurrence of p is positive in A, i.e. every occurrence of p in A occurs within the scope of an even number of negations (in this case we say that A is p-positive). The system K(µ) is obtained from the basic modal logic K by adding the closure axiom scheme and the induction rule, provided that A is p-positive:
The greatest fixed point operator is defined as follows:
The background modal logic K can be extended to other modal logics to obtain consistent extensions of K(µ), such as S4(µ) and S5(µ). For more detailed exposition see [12, 29] .
Mardaev in [35] showed that special family of p-positive formulas has fixed points in S4: for any S4-formula A(p, q 1 , . . . , q n ) in which p is positive, there exists a formula D( q 1 , . . . , q n ) such that
Mardaev also shows that every p-positive Σ-formula ϕ(p,q) has a fixed point in K4 (cf. [33] ), and every p-positive Π-formula ϕ(p,q) has a fixed point in GL (cf. [34] ). For the definition of Σ-and Π-formulas and a survey of Mardaev's results see [36] .
It is worth noting that the Knower Paradox cannot be formalized in the modal µ-calculus, since we need the fixed point of the formula A(p) = ¬ p in which p is not positive. However, Halpern and Moses [28] formalized some versions of the Surprise Test Paradox within a fixed point modal logic similar to modal µ-calculus.
Connections
The connection between GL and modal µ-calculus has been studied by authors. Van Benthem in [9] showed that GL can be faithfully embedded into K(µ). He also showed that Theorem 3.6.
Since in the µ-calculus upward well-foundedness 4 can be expressed by the formula µp. p, the above theorem says that upward well-foundedness is modally definable (by the Löb axiom) together with transitivity.
Visser in [52] gave another interpretation of GL into K(µ). He also proved a generalized fixed point property for GL. Finally, Alberucci and Facchini in [1] showed that the modal µ-calculus over GL collapses to GL. They also gave a new proof for the de Jongh-Sambin Fixed Point Theorem in GL.
Justification logics
The language of justification logics is an extension of the language of propositional logic by the formulas of the form t : F , where F is a formula and t is a justification term. Justification terms (or terms for short) are built up from (justification) variables x, y, z, . . . (possibly with subscript) and (justification) constants a, b, c, . . . (possibly with subscript) using several operations depending on the logic: (binary) application '·', (binary) sum '+', (unary) verifier '!', (unary) negative verifier '?', and (unary) weak negative verifier '?'. Justification formulas are constructed by the following grammar:
where p is a propositional variable and t is a justification term.
We now begin with describing the axiom schemes and rules of the basic justification logic J, and continue with other justification logics. The basic justification logic J is the weakest justification logic we shall be discussing. Other justification logics are obtained by adding certain axiom schemes to J. Definition 4.1. Axioms schemes of J are:
Other justification logics are obtained by adding the following axiom schemes to J in various combinations:
All justification logics have the inference rule Modus Ponens, and the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule:
A, where A is an axiom instance of the logic, c ij 's are arbitrary justification constants and n ≥ 1.
The language of each justification logic includes those operations on terms that are present in its axioms. Moreover, as in the case of modal logic, the name of each justification logic is indicated by the list of its axioms. For example, JT4 is the extension of J by axioms jT and j4, in the language containing term operations ·, +, and !. JT4 is usually called the logic of proofs LP.
Remark 4.1. The rule IAN can be replaced by the following rule, called Axiom Necessitation rule, in those justification logics that contain axiom j4:
AN. ⊢ c : A, where A is an axiom instance of the logic and c is an arbitrary justification constant.
Artemov used this rule in his formulation of the logic of proofs LP. We will use this rule in the formulation of quantified logic of proofs in Section 6.
Definition 4.2. 1. Given a justification logic JL, the total constant specification T CS of JL is the set of all formulas of the form c in : c in−1 : . . . : c i1 : A, where n ≥ 1, A is an axiom instance of JL and c ij 's are arbitrary justification constants. 2. A constant specification CS for JL is a subset of the total constant specification of JL. 3. A constant specification CS is axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom instance A of JL there is a constant c such that c : A ∈ CS, and if F ∈ CS then c : F ∈ CS for some constant c.
Let JL CS be the fragment of JL where the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule only produces formulas from the given CS. Thus JL ∅ denotes the fragment of JL without the Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule. Note that the total constant specification T CS is axiomatically appropriate.
The deduction theorem and substitution lemma holds in all justification logics. The following lemma was first proved by Artrmov in [4] .
Lemma 4.2 (Lifting Lemma).
Given an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS for JL, if JL CS , A 1 , . . . , A n ⊢ F, then for some justification term t(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and justification variables x 1 , . . . , x n JL CS , x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n ⊢ t(x 1 , . . . , x n ) : F.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F . We have three base cases:
-If F is an axiom, then put t := c, for a justification constant c, and use rule IAN to obtain c : F .
Induction step:
-Let F be obtained by Modus Ponens from G → F and G. By induction hypothesis, there are terms u(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and v(x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that u : (G → F ) and v : G are derivable from x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n . Then put t := u.v and use the axiom jK to obtain u · v : F . -Let F be obtained from Iterated Axiom Necessitation rule, so F = c in : c in−1 :
. . . : c i1 : B ∈ CS, for some axiom instance B. Then since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a justification constant c such that c : c in : c in−1 : . . . : c i1 : B ∈ CS. Thus, put t := c ⊓ ⊔
One of the important properties of justification logics is the internalization property.
Lemma 4.3 (Internalization Lemma
). Given an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS for JL, if JL CS ⊢ F , then there is a justification term t such that JL CS ⊢ t : F . Proof. Special case of Lemma 4.2.
⊓ ⊔
The following lemma is helpful. in the next section. In the sequel, we will state the precise connection between modal and justification logics. For comparison, axioms and rules of LP and S4 are given in Table  1 .
Modal logic S4
Logic of proofs LP
A is an axiom instance ⊢c:A Table 1 . The correspondence between S4 and LP.
Definition 4.3. The forgetful projection • is a mapping from the set of justification formulas into the set of modal formulas, defined recursively as follows:
• := ⊥, • commutes with propositional connectives, and (t : A)
Theorem 4.2 (Realization Theorem, [4, 5, 13, 27, 43] ). JL • = ML.
If JL • = ML, then JL is called the justification counterpart of ML. The justification counterpart of Gödel-Löb provability logic EGL is introduced in [25] . EGL is an extension of J4 by the explicit Löb axiom schema:
It is proved that EGL • = GL. This, together with Solovay's arithmetical completeness of GL ( [48] ), implies the arithmetical provability completeness of EGL, EGL ֒→ GL ֒→ PA, in which t : A is interpreted as "A is provable in PA."
Fixed points in justification logics
In this section we study the effect of adding fixed points to justification logics. Some justification logics inherits the fixed point property from GL. For example, the logic of proofs and provability GLA (see [6, 40] ) is such a logic. GLA has axioms and rules of GL and LP (in their joint language), together with axioms t : A → A, ¬t : A → ¬t : A, t : A → A, and the reflection rule: from ⊢ A, infer ⊢ A. It is obvious that every formula A(p,q) in the language of modal logic in which p is modalized has a fixed point in GLA.
It is worth noting that a fixed point theorem for two operation-free logics of proofs was given by Straßen in [51] . The systems considered there only use variables as terms and have no term operations (such as · and +) and hence are not of interest for current paper.
Justification logics with fixed point operators
Suppose JL is a propositional justification logic defined over a language L for which the internalization and substitution lemma could be proved. An occurrence of a propositional letter p is called justified in the formula A(p, q 1 , . . . , q n ) if p occurs in the scope of a justification operator :. Let L(FP) be the extension of L by n-ary fixed point operators δ A (q 1 , . . . , q n ) for each L-formula A(p, q 1 , . . . , q n ) in which p is justified. The fixed point extension of justification logic JL, denoted JL(FP), in the language L(FP) is an extension of JL by fixed point axiom schemes
The definitions of constant specification and JL(FP) CS are similar to those of JL. It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds in JL(FP) CS , for arbitrary CS, the substitution lemma holds in JL(FP) T CS and JL(FP) ∅ , and the internalization lemma holds in JL(FP) CS , for axiomatically appropriate CS.
Next the analogs of the Knower and the Believer Paradoxes are formulated in the framework of justification logics. Proof. In the following we derive a contradiction in JL(FP) using the fixed point axiom for the formula A(p) = ¬x : p. 
Lemma 5.1. Given a constant specification CS for J4(FP) and a formula F in the language of
Proof. By induction on the proof of F in J4(FP) CS . We only check the case that F is a fixed point axiom. Suppose p is justified in the J4-formula A(p,q), and F is
for J4(FP)-formulas B 1 , . . . , B n . Hence,
Since p is justified in A(p,q), p is modalized in A • (p,q). Therefore, for the fixed point operator δ A • (q) we have 
Justification µ-calculus
In the previous section we showed that the fixed point extension of some of the justification logics is inconsistent. In this section, we try to find a consistent fixed point extension of these logics, based on µ-calculus. First we introduce a justification version of the modal mu-calculus K(µ), called J(µ). The language of J(µ) is an expansion of the language of J. Terms of J(µ) are defined similar to the terms of J by the following grammar:
Formulas of J(µ) are formed by the following grammar:
where p is a propositional letter, t is a term, and in µp.A the formula A is ppositive. We also assume to have the usual definitions for ¬, ∨, → and ↔ as logical connectives in the above language. ⊥ is defined as A ∧ ¬A for some J(µ)-formula A. In addition νp.A is defined as before:
J(µ) is axiomatizable by adjoining to the basic justification logic J the closure axiom scheme µ-CL and the induction rule µ-IND from Section 3.2. The definitions of constant specification and J(µ) CS are similar to those of JL.
It is easy to verify that the deduction theorem holds in J(µ) CS , for arbitrary CS, and the substitution lemma holds in J(µ) T CS and J(µ) ∅ . Note that the internalization lemma does not hold in J(µ) in its general form.
Lemma 5.3 (Internalization Lemma for J(µ)).
Given an axiomatically appropriate constant specification CS for J(µ), if J(µ)-formula F is derivable in J(µ) CS without the use of rule µ-IND, then there is a justification term t such that J(µ) CS ⊢ t : F .
Next by translating J(µ) into modal µ-calculus K(µ) we show that J(µ) is consistent. Lemma 5.4. Given a constant specification CS for J(µ), for every
Proof. By induction on the proof of formula A in J(µ) CS .
Corollary 5.2. Given a constant specification CS for J(µ), J(µ) CS is consistent.
Proof. Suppose J(µ) is inconsistent, J(µ) CS ⊢ ⊥. Thus, by Lemma 5.4 we have
Since the modal part of the µ-calculus K(µ) can be consistently extended to other modal logics, such as T, S4, S5, we can consistently add other justification axioms to J(µ). For example, LP(µ) is obtained by adding the term operator ! to the language of J(µ) and the axioms jT and j4 to J(µ), and JT45(µ) is obtained by adding the term operator ? to the language of LP(µ) and the axioms j5 to LP(µ). The proof of consistency of JT45(µ) and LP(µ) is similar to the proof of Corollary 5.2.
Fixed points in the quantified logic of proofs
So far we have only considered the propositional justification logics. There are two known ways to introduce quantifiers in the logic of proofs:
1. Quantifiers over objects (which the objects are interpreted as elements of the domain of models). Artemov and Yavorskaya [7] proved that first order logic of proofs equipped with an arithmetical provability semantics is not axiomatizable. Without the arithmetical provability semantics an axiomatic system for first order logic of proofs is given in [8] . 2. Quantifiers over justifications or proofs. Yavorsky [54] proved that the logic of proofs with quantifiers over proofs equipped with an arithmetical provability semantics is not axiomatizable. Without the arithmetical provability semantics an axiomatic system for logic of proofs with quantifiers over justifications is given by Fitting in [20, 22] .
In the following we recall the Fitting's quantified logic of proofs QLP. Then we introduce fixed point extension of QLP, and formalize the Knower and the Surprise Test Paradoxes in QLP.
Axiom system and basic properties of QLP
Instead of simple justification constants, Fitting uses primitive proof terms. In fact, the language of QLP contains a countable set of primitive function symbols of various arities. Primitive function symbols with arity 0 are indeed justification constants. A primitive (proof) term is a term of the form f n (x 1 , . . . , x n ), or simply f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), where f n is a primitive function symbol of arity n and x 1 , . . . , x n are justification variables.
Let us first describe the language and axiom system of QLP − (a subsystem of QLP introduced in [16] ), and then those of QLP. Justification terms and formulas of QLP − are constructed by the following grammars:
where i, n are non-negative integers, x, x i 's are justification variables, t is a justification term, and f n (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a primitive proof term. Note that the universal quantifier quantifies over justification variables. The definition of free and bound occurrences of variables and substitution of variables by terms are as in the first order logic.
Axioms and rules of QLP − are a combination of axioms and rules of first order logic and logic of proofs LP. More precisely, axioms of QLP − are:
Taut. All tautologies of propositional logic,
, where x does not occur free in A, Q3. A(t) → (∃x)A(x), where t is free for
, where x does not occur free in B,
Rules of QLP − are Modus Ponens, Generalization, and Axiom Necessitation rule:
where f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a primitive term. Fitting's quantified logic of proofs is an extension of QLP − by first adding a term operator as follows: if t is a term and x is a justification variable, then (t∀x) is a term. The occurrence of x in (t∀x) is considered to be bound. Thus justification terms of QLP are constructed by the following grammar:
QLP in addition has the following axiom, called uniformity formula UF:
(∃y)y : (∀x)t : A → (t∀x) : (∀x)A, provided that y does not occur free in t or A, and Quantified Necessitation rule:
Definition 6.1. 1. The total primitive term specification for QLP (QLP − ) is the set of all formulas of the form f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) : A, where A is an axiom instance of QLP (QLP − ) and f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a primitive term. 2. A primitive term specification F for QLP (QLP − ) is a subset of the total primitive term specification for QLP (QLP − ). 3. A primitive term specification F for QLP (QLP − ) is called axiomatically appropriate if for each axiom instance A of QLP (QLP − ) there is a primitive term
Let QLP F (QLP − F ) be the fragment of QLP (QLP − ) where the Axiom Necessitation rule only produces formulas from F . Thus QLP ∅ (QLP − ∅ ) denotes the fragment of QLP (QLP − ) without the Axiom Necessitation rule. It is easy to show the following (see [22] ). Theorem 6.1. Given a primitive term specification F , the Justified Universal Generalization rule:
Proof. Suppose QLP F ⊢ t : A(x). By Gen, we get QLP F ⊢ (∀x)t : A(x). Then by qNec, we get QLP F ⊢ (∃y)y : (∀x)t : A(x), for a variable y where does not occur free in t or A. By axiom UF and MP, we obtain QLP F ⊢ (t∀x) : (∀x)A(x) as desire. ⊓ ⊔ In fact, the original axiomatization of QLP in [22] has the rule JUG instead of Gen and qNec.
Lemma 6.1 (Internalization Lemma for QLP). Let F be an axiomatically appropriate primitive term specification. If QLP F ⊢ F , then there is a justification term t such that QLP F ⊢ t : F .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the derivation of F in QLP F (similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2). The only new cases are when F is obtained by Gen and qNec.
For the case of Gen, suppose F = (∀x)A is obtained from A. By the induction hypothesis, there is a term u such that u : A is derivable in QLP F . Using Gen, we have (∀x)u : A. Then by qNec, we get (∃y)y : (∀x)u : A. By axiom UF and MP, we obtain (u∀x) : (∀x)A(x). Thus it suffices to put t := (u∀x).
For the case of qNec, suppose F = (∃x)x : A is obtained from A. By the induction hypothesis, there is a term u such that u : A is derivable in QLP F . By axiom j4 and MP, we get !u : u : A. Since u : A → (∃x)x : A is an instance of axiom Q3, by AN we get c : (u : A → (∃x)x : A) for some constant c. Now from the latter and !u : u : A and axiom jK, we get c·!u : (∃x)x : A. Thus it suffices to put t := c·!u.
⊓ ⊔
As you can see from the above proof in order to obtain an internalized version of the Generalization rule we need the uniformity formula. Therefore, in general the internalization property does not hold in QLP − . However we have a restricted form of the internalization lemma.
Lemma 6.2 (Internalization Lemma for QLP
− ). Let F be an axiomatically appropriate primitive term specification. If F is derivable in QLP − F without the use of rule Gen, then there is a justification term t such that QLP − F ⊢ t : F . Fitting [22] gives a translation from propositional modal logic S4 into QLP as follows.
Definition 6.2. The mapping ∃ from S4-formulas into QLP-formulas is defined as follows:
Theorem 6.2 ([22] ). For every S4-formula A,
The same translation is considered by Yavorsky in [54] for his quantified logic of proofs qLP. Yavorsky also proved that GL can be embedded into qLP. This result is expected since Yavorsky's qLP enjoys the arithmetical provability semantics.
If we interpret the modality as knowledge (i.e. F is read as "F is known"), then the translation A ⇋ (∃x)x : A gives the following (related) interpretations of knowledge:
1. Proof-based interpretation of knowledge, where knowledge of A (indeed in Yavorsky's qLP) means "there is a formal proof for A" or "A is provable." 2. Evidence-based interpretation of knowledge, where knowledge of A (indeed in Fitting's QLP) means "there is an evidence (or justifiation) for A."
Although the evidence-based interpretation of knowledge satisfies the principle of knowledge veracity: (∃x)x : ϕ → ϕ, the proof-based interpretation does not.
Fixed point extension of QLP
Next let us turn to the fixed point extension of QLP. If we define the fixed point extension of QLP as the one for propositional justification logics in Section 5.1 (i.e. fixed point axioms are defined for formulas with justified occurrences of propositional variables), then Theorem 5.1 already shows that this fixed point extension is inconsistent. According to Definition 6.2, it is natural to define fixed point axioms for formulas with boxed occurrences of propositional variables (this is similar to one defined for fixed point extensions of modal logics in Section 3.1).
The propositional formula p is called ∃-justified in the QLP-formula A(p,q) if all occurrences of p are in the scope of (∃x)x : ..., for some variable x, in A(p,q). To put it otherwise, if all occurrences of (∃x)x : ..., for some variable x, in the QLP-formula A(p,q) is replaced by , then p is ∃-justified in A(p,q) if all occurrences of p are in the scope of in A(p,q).
Now extend the language of QLP by fixed point operators δ A (q), for each QLPformula A(p,q) in which p is ∃-justified. The fixed point extension of QLP, denoted by QLP(FP) is obtained by adding the fixed point axioms:
where p is ∃-justified in A(p,q), andB is a list of QLP(FP)-formulas.
In the rest of this section it is useful to consider intermediate systems between QLP and QLP(FP). Given the QLP-formula A(p,q) in which p is ∃-justified, first extend the language of QLP by single fixed point operator δ A (q), and then we define the logic
to be the extension of QLP with single fixed point axiom δ A (B) ↔ A(δ A (B),B). This notion is useful when we are dealing with the extension of QLP with a single particular fixed point axiom.
The definition of primitive term specification, QLP(FP) F , and QLP(F ) F , for fixed point axiom F , is similar to those of QLP. All the definitions given above can be stated for QLP − instead of QLP as well.
The Knower Paradaox in QLP
Using the idea of evidence-based interpretation of knowledge, the Knower Paradox was redeveloped in [2, 17] within Fitting's quantified logic of proofs QLP.
is expressible in QLP by the formula:
We give the proof of the Knower in fixed point extension of QLP. Note that the above proof cannot be proceeded in QLP − , since we use rule qNec (in step 10). 
Proof. See Appendix A.
⊓ ⊔
The Knower Paradox was also studied in [16] in the framework of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs from [20] . The quantified logic of proofs presented in [20] has the same language of QLP but instead of axiom UF and rule qNec it contains the following axiom (called Uniform Barcan Formula):
where x does not occur free in t. Dean and Kurokawa presented some arguments against this axiom, and suggest to resolve the Knower Paradox by abandoning it. Theorem 6.3 implies that QLP(FP) is inconsistent.
Dean and Kurokawa in [16] give an arithmetical interpretation for QLP − , and show the arithmetic soundness of QLP − : the interpretation of every formula provable in QLP − is true in the standard model of arithmetic. It is natural to interpret fixed point operators of QLP − (FP) by fixed point sentences of PA produced by the fixed point lemma (Lemma 2.1). Having proved this fact, it is easy to prove that QLP − (FP) is consistent. We leave the details for future work.
The Surprise Test Paradaox in QLP
In this section we analyze the Surprise Test paradox in the framework of QLP, when we have an evidence-based interpretation of knowledge in mind.
Since the test is supposed to be surprise for students (and not for non-students), it is helpful to consider a multi-agent version of QLP. Suppose A = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of agents. The language of multi-agent quantified logic of proofs QLP n is similar to QLP with the difference that formulas are constructed by the following grammar:
where s ∈ A. The justification assertion t : s A is read "the agent s considers t as a justification (or reason) for A." Axioms and rules of QLP n are those of QLP where " : " is replaced by " : s " everywhere, for arbitrary agent s in A. One can show that QLP n is consistent, by giving a translation from the language of QLP n to the language of QLP that maps t : s A into t : A.
Now it is natural to interpret a surprise statement A as a statement for which there is no justification or reason. This can be expressed in QLP as ¬(∃x)x : A. More precisely, "A is a surprise for s" ⇋ "s has no reason for A" ⇋ "¬(∃x)x : s A"
To keep the notation simple, we consider a class with only one student s and use " : " instead of " : s ". In the sequel we formalize various versions of the Surprise Test Paradox in QLP and its fixed point extensions.
First consider the Kaplan-Montagues self-reference one-day case version of the paradox, the Examiner Paradox:
This sentence was formalized in Section 2 as follows:
where E denotes the sentence "you will have a test tomorrow." The sentence (3) is expressed in QLP(FP) as follows:
where δ = δ A (E) is the fixed point operator of the formula
We show that the Examiner Paradox leads to a contradiction in QLP. 
We show that it is provable in QLP − that teacher's announcement (4) is a blindspot for the student s.
Theorem 6.10.
, from 2 by propositional reasoning 4. y : s F → y : s F , an instance of a propositional tautology 5. c : s (F → E) → (y : s F → c · y : s E), an instance of axiom jK 6. y : s F → c · y : s E, from 3, 4, 5 by propositional reasoning 7. c · y : s E → (∃x)x : s E, an instance of axiom Q3 8. y : s F → (∃x)x : s E, from 6, 7 by propositional reasoning 9. F → ¬(∃x)x : s E, an instance of a propositional tautology 10. y : s F → F , an instance of axiom jT 11. y : s F → ¬(∃x)x : s E, from 9, 10 by propositional reasoning 12. ¬y : s F , from 8, 11 by propositional reasoning 13. (∀y)¬y : s F , from 12 by Gen 14. ¬(∃y)y : s F , from 13 by reasoning in first order logic.
⊓ ⊔ But note that (4) is not necessarily a blindspot for others, i.e. we could consistently have (∃y)y : s ′ [E ∧ ¬(∃x)x : s E] for a non-student person s ′ .
Conclusion
We have presented several fixed point extensions of justification logics: extensions by fixed point operators, and extensions by least fixed points. There remained one problem here. Is there a justification logic with the fixed point property, namely a justification logic for which a fixed point theorem can be proved in its original language? A complete affirmative answer to this question is not expected, since the rule substitution of equivalents SE does not hold in justification logics (as noted in the Introduction).
We have also presented fixed point extensions of Fitting's quantified logic of proofs, and formalize the Knower Paradox and various versions of the Surprise Test Paradox in these extensions. By interpreting a surprise statement as a statement for which there is no justification, we give a solution to the self-reference version of the Surprise Test Paradox. Our analysis of theses paradoxes presumes evidence-based interpretation of knowledge, that is to say knowledge of a fact means there is an evidence for that fact. With regard to this fact, the paradoxes could be resolved in QLP − , i.e by restricting the axioms and rules of quantified logic of proofs to those of first order logic and LP. In this respect, it seems that the rule qNec is unproblematic, since it is the evidence-based counterpart of modal Necessitation rule. Thus, the only possible state is to reject the uniformity formula UF. This observation agrees with Dean-Kurokawa's analysis [17] which found the rule JUG suspicious. Since M-models are single-world Fitting models, the soundness theorem of QLP − with respect to M-models is a consequence of Fitting's soundness theorem in [22] . Our purpose is now to show Theorems 6.4, 6.6, and 6.8, by constructing countermodels (using the soundness theorem). These theorems are restated here for convenience:
Note that in all of the above theorems δ's are fixed point operators. Therefore we should actually extend the aforementioned semantics of QLP − to QLP − (FP), and give semantic interpretation for fixed point operators. But let us simply assume for now that fixed point operators are new propositional variables that are not in the language of QLP − . Recall that for QLP − -formula F , QLP − (F ) denotes the extension of QLP − by axiom F . Now it is easy to see the following soundness theorem for QLP − (F ). 
